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Abstract 
Dialectics and a dialogical approach constitute two distinct theoretical frameworks with long intellectual histories. The 
question of relations between dialogue and dialectics provokes discussions in academic communities. The present 
paper highlights the need to clarify the concepts ‘dialogue’ and ‘dialectics’ and explore their origins in the history of 
human thought. The paper attempts to examine mutual relations between dialectics and dialogue in a historical 
perspective and develop a theoretical reconstruction of their philosophical underpinnings. It proposes to deal with 
challenges connected with the creation of spaces for sharing and mutual enrichment between dialogue and dialectics. 
Manolis Dafermos is an associate professor in the epistemology of psychology in the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Crete. He holds a PhD in Philosophy from the Lomonosov Moscow State 
University. His interests include cultural historical psychology, critical psychology, the history of 
psychology, and methodological and epistemological issues in the social sciences. 
 
Introduction 
The question of the relations between dialogue and dialectics has been the topic of extensive 
debates in the international academic communities. Diametrically opposite positions have been stated by 
different scholars (Reigel, 1979; White, 2011; Matusov, & Hayes, 2000; Sullivan, 2010; Nikulin, 2010; 
Matusov, 2011; Rule, 2015). This question has been formulated by many of them as a question of 
relations between Bakhtinian Dialogic and Vygotskian Dialectic. The integration (or combination) between 
Bakhtin's ideas of dialogism and Vygotsky's Cultural historical psychology has been presented as an 
attractive perspective in human and social sciences (Wertsch, 1993; Roth, 2013). Other scholars focus on 
fundamental differences between Vygotsky's and Bakhtin's research programs and the theoretical 
incompatibility of their theories (Cheyne, & Tarulli, 1999; Wegerif, 2008; White, 2011; Matusov, 2011).  
From my perspective, the question of the relationship between Vygotsky's and Bakhtin's theories 
could be examined as a part of the wider issue of the relationship between dialogue and dialectics in the 
context of the history of human thought. Under the influence of postmodern theories, an exceedingly 
hostile stance towards dialectics became dominant in the North Atlantic Academy. “Recourse to dialectics 
is generally associated with grand, totalising social theory and a ‘foundationalist’ epistemology... ” 
(Gardiner, 2000, p.119). The anti-dialectic stance is very strong in the field of Bakhtin studies in which a 
dialogical approach has been developed. The representatives of the anti-dialectic ‘camp’ focus mainly on 
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the conceptual incommensurability and incompatibility of dialectics and dialogism. In contrast to this 
dominant interpretation, several thinkers consider dialogue and dialectical thinking as compatible 
concepts (Paul, 2012) and several attempts have been made to integrate dialogue and dialectics (for 
example, the theory of relational dialectic) (Baxter, 2004).   
The present paper is an attempt to examine the complex and ambiguous relationship between 
dialogue and dialectics focusing mainly on their philosophical underpinnings. Firstly, I concentrate on 
defining the concepts dialogue and dialectics, their origin and multiple meanings. This requires a 
reconstruction of the genesis of these concepts in the history of human thought. Secondly, the present 
paper explores the relationships between dialectics and dialogue as well as several attempts to compare, 
contrast or integrate them. 
The underlying purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that despite their fundamental differences, 
the dialogical approach and dialectics can be brought closer together. It is important to understand that 
the relations between different approaches such as dialogical and dialectical approaches are not fixed 
and stable, but they change in the history of human thought. What may seem impossible in one particular 
stage of development in the history of human thought becomes possible in another. The paper explores 
the possibility of the creation of a common space between dialogism and dialectics as theoretical 
frameworks and the perspective of their mutual enrichment.   
A historical and philosophical account of the dynamic and changing relations between dialogue 
and dialectics can challenge the presently dominant idea about their total incompatibility and offer an 
insight into contemporary discussion in the field of dialogical pedagogy. In contrast to mainstream 
schooling, bringing together dialogue and dialectics may create the space for alternative and 
unpredictable encounters in the domain of education. Βringing together dialogue and dialectics in the 
domain of education is a promising, open-ended issue, outside the scope of the present paper that 
focuses mainly on the philosophical examination of dialogue and dialectics as theoretical frameworks. 
The paper is intended to encourage scholars and practitioners to think seriously about the possibility of 
the creation of a common space between dialogue and dialectic that remains largely terra incognita. 
What is dialogue? 
Dialogue in different forms (political, philosophical, and dramatic) historically emerged in Ancient 
Greece in the context of the polis as a community of actively participating citizens (Dafermos, 2013a). 
Plato's dialogues, the first written dialogical accounts in human history were formed in the context of 
ancient polis.  
After a long eclipse in the history of human thought dialogue was reborn in the twentieth century 
in the writings of Russian literary theorist and philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin. He developed a multifaceted 
theory of dialogism based on a set of concepts such as dialogue, monologue, polyphony, heteroglossia, 
utterance, voice, speech genres and chronotope. Bakhtin's writings inspired many scholars and 
practitioners to elaborate and apply various dialogical approaches in pedagogy (Matusov, 2009; Matusov, 
& Miyazaki, 2014), psychology (Shotter, 1995; Hermans, & Kempen, 1993), psychotherapy (Seikkula, 
2011; Hermans, & Dimaggio, 2004) and cultural studies (Wertsch, 1993; Thornton, 1994).   
One of the reasons for the apparent confusion in the emerging interdisciplinary field of dialogical 
studies is connected with the polysemy of the notion of dialogue and the multiple meanings of its use in 
different contexts. I will attempt to define several meanings of the term ‘dialogue’. In accordance with a 
first definition, dialogue is a live conversation between two or more people. In other words, dialogue can 
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be indentified with oral communication between two or more interlocutors. Being with other people and 
responding to their voices is an essential feature of a conversation. However, a difficult question at once 
arises whether dialogue is every form of conversation or a specific type of deep communication between 
different subjectivities. Nikulin (2010) defined four components that turn a conversation into a dialogue: a. 
the existence of personal other, b. voice, c. unfinalizability, d. allosensus (constant disagreement with 
other).  
The second meaning of the term ‘dialogue’ refers to dialogue as a genre or literary device. Plato's 
dialogues are one of the most famous forms of using a dialogical form as a genre. Plato's written 
dialogues historically appeared as an imitation of oral communication in times of heated debates about 
the transition from oral to written communication. Dialogue as a genre has been used by many thinkers to 
formulate their ideas in various ways. However, the dialogical genre might be used as an external form for 
monological content. For example, dialogue might be used as a teaching method of catechesis. It refers 
to an instrumental approach to dialogue that tends to be considered as an “an effective means for non-
dialogic ends, which are understood outside of the notion of dialogue, within a monological framework” 
(Matusov, & Miyazaki, 2014, p.2). However, if there is a perfect, final and absolute truth as in catechesis, 
there is no place and need for genuine dialogue.  
In accordance with a third meaning, “...dialogue is the universal condition of using language at all” 
(Womack, 2011, p.48). From this perspective both oral and written speech, moreover, language itself has 
a dialogical character. Language can be considered mainly as an intersubjective communicative 
engagement, rather than a simple, formal, symbolic system.  
Bakhtin offered a classic formulation of the dialogic nature of consciousness that can be regarded 
as the fourth meaning of the dialogue which goes beyond purely linguistic or literary phenomena: “I am 
conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself for another, through another, and 
with the help of another. The most important acts constituting self-consciousness are determined by a 
relationship toward another consciousness (toward a thou) … The very being of man (both external and 
internal) is the deepest communion. To be means to communicate … To be means to be for another, and 
through the other for oneself” (Bakhtin, 1981, p.287). 
Dialogue is an essential characteristic of consciousness. The word ‘consciousness’ originates 
from the Latin ‘conscius’ (con- ‘together’ + scientia- ‘to know’). ‘Conscious’ means sharing knowledge. 
Toulmin (1982) offers a brilliant interpretation of the etymology of the term ‘consciousness’:  
“Etymologically, of course, the term ‘consciousness’ is a knowledge word. This is evidenced by 
the Latin form, -sci-, in the middle of the word. But what are we to make of the prefix con- that precedes 
it? Look at the usage in Roman Law, and the answer will be easy enough. Two or more agents who act 
jointly—having formed a common intention, framed a shared plan, and concerted their actions—are as a 
result conscientes. They act as they do knowing one another’s plans: they are jointly knowing” (Toulmin, 
1982, p. 64).  
In Latin “to be conscious of something was to share knowledge of it, with someone else, or with 
oneself” (Zeman, 2001, p.1265). “When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are said to 
be conscious of it one to another” (Hobbes, 1660, Leviathan, chapt. VII). However, the predominant use 
of the term ‘consciousness’ is connected with John Locke's definition: “Consciousness is the perception of 
what passes in a man's own mind” (Locke, 1690, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, i, 19). It 
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refers to ‘inner perceptions’ that are conceived by an individual. The understanding of consciousness as a 
private, internal awareness became dominant in contemporary scientific literature.  
 However, it is interesting to note that the term ‘consciousness’ has similar etymology in different 
languages: In Russian ‘Сознание’ (Со-знание), in Greek ‘συνείδηση’ (συν- ειδέναι), in English ‘Con-
scientia,’ in French ‘Conscience’ (Con-science), in Italian ‘Coscienza’ (Co-scienza). The prefix ‘co’ refers 
to joint action, reciprocal interaction between people. The concept of ‘consciousness’ includes knowledge 
as its essential moment. However, consciousness is not reducible to simple knowledge but it refers to co-
producing knowledge in the process of communication between different subjects. It refers to joining 
knowledge with another or shared knowledge. From this perspective, consciousness has dialogic 
structure and orientation.  
The understanding of the dialogic nature of consciousness enables the demonstration of the 
mirrors of cognitivism and scientism. One of the most powerful objections to cognitivism has been 
formulated by Michael Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual 
person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic 
interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 110).  
Dialogue has been defined by Bakhtin as opposed to monologism. Individual consciousness 
cannot grasp the complexity and variety of the human world. In contrast to the single, isolated, 
monological consciousness, a dialogical coexistence of different irreducible consciousnesses develops. 
Bakhtin argued that the idea is not developed in isolated individual consciousness but in dialogic 
communication between several consciousnesses. “...the idea is inter-individual and inter-subjective - the 
realm of its existence is not individual consciousness but dialogic communion between consciousnesses. 
The idea is a live event, played out at the point of dialogic meeting between two or several 
consciousnesses” (Bakhtin, 2003, p.98). The meeting spaces and dramatic processes of making meaning 
between different and not reducible consciousnesses constitute the ontological foundation of dialogue. 
The “ontological dialogue” (Sidorkin, 1999; Matusov, & Miyazaki, 2014) between consciousnesses 
penetrates the deeper and most important aspects of human existence.  
Although dialogue has been defined as being contrary to monologue, the consideration of 
dialogue as a positive and monologue as a negative term leads inevitably to oversimplification of dialectic 
relationships between them. I totally agree with Matusov's position that “Bakhtin’s notions of dialogue and 
monologue is complementary” (Matusov, 2009, p.112). Matusov argues that the concepts of dialogicity 
and monologicity mutually constitute each other. “Monologicity makes clear who is speaking (i.e., 
authorship and responsibility) and what is said (i.e., the message). In other words, monologicity 
objectivizes others and the themes of communication... Monologicity reflects centripetal forces of 
language, communication, and community oriented on centralization, unification, unity with action, 
seriousness, cohesiveness and integrity of voice (and position), articulateness, globalization, 
decontextualization, exactness and correctness of meaning (finalizing the meaning)” (Matusov, 2009, p. 
131).  
However, many Bakhtinian scholars tend to interpret the concepts ‘dialogue-monologue’ in terms 
of Western post-modernism such as ‘the death of author’ (more generally, the ‘death of subject’), 
‘deconstruction,’ ‘decentration,’ ‘intertextuality’ (Bell, & Gardiner, 1998; Holquist, 2002). From the 
perspective of post-modernism, monologue is defined as a ‘grand narrative’ that should be ‘killed’ and 
‘destroyed’. With the total ‘death of monologue’ any claims for ‘seriousness,’ ‘cohesiveness,’ ‘integrity of 
voice (and position),’ ‘articulateness’ and ‘correctness of meaning’ might disappear. The celebration of 
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post-modern, deconstructionist discourse tends to lead to the deconstruction not only of ‘old’ metaphysics 
and ‘grand’ monologic narratives, but also of scientific thinking and knowledge itself. “...the deconstruction 
of metaphysics is the deconstruction of the scientificity of science. The deconstructive strategy aims at the 
very source of science itself, at the kind of question that gives rise to scientific investigation” (Evans, 
1999, p.156).  
It could be argued that the destruction of reason itself may give rise to a new form of irrationalism. 
Based on the analysis of post-Hegelian philosophical tradition, Lukács (1954) demonstrated that the 
destruction of reason and the advent of irrationalism prepared the ground for fascist ideas.  
Flecha (1999) distinguishes two kinds of racism: modern racism is based on the idea of the 
existence of inferior or superior ethnicities and races, while postmodernist racism built on postmodern 
relativism, “...accepts diversity and difference but accords different groups a place in their own, distinctive 
contexts” (Flecha, 1999, p. 153). Postmodern relativism promotes proliferation of differences and 
fragmentation of social space. Flecha proposes a dialogic approach as an alternative platform that can 
deal simultaneously with both forms of racism. Dialogue as a dynamic and positive force offers the 
opportunity to stimulate unpredictable meetings between the participants and build bridges across 
differences. Going beyond the tension between absolutism and postmodern relativism, dialogue can 
promote deep communication and encourage mutual recognition and understanding between the 
participants. 
What is dialectics? 
The concept ‘dialectics’ has acquired different forms and meanings in various historical contexts. 
In ancient Greece dialectics emerged as an art of dialogue and a problem solving method through 
argumentation. The term ‘dialectics’ has a similar origin of the term ‘dialogue’. It refers to the art of 
conversation or debate that is connected with seeking truth through reasoning. “... someone tries, by 
means of dialectical discussion and without the aid of any sense-perceptions, to arrive through reason at 
the being of each thing itself” (Plato, 2004, Republic, 532a). By the power of discussions, dialectics 
provides genuine knowledge. Dialectics as a method originates from the Socratic elenchus, a method of 
hypothesis elimination that takes the form of a question-answer dialogue and brings out the contradictions 
in the interlocutor's arguments.  
Dialectics constitutes a way of thinking based on the understanding of the contradictory nature of 
both reason and being. Naive, spontaneous dialectics had been developed by ancient thinkers as an 
attempt to offer a living, sensory concrete perception of the world in the process of its change and 
becoming. “Tao-Te-Ching” in Ancient China as well as Heraclitus’ philosophy in Ancient Greece were 
forms of ancient spontaneous dialectics that were expressed in the idea that “everything is in a state of 
flux” (Skirbekk, & Gilje, 2001, p.13). Although Heraclitus didn't use the term ‘dialectic,’ he developed a 
dialectical understanding that everything is becoming. However, a conceptual, categorical system for the 
representation of things as processes did not yet exist in the ancient world. Becoming is expressed 
through metaphors, images of an aesthetic equivalent such as the image of a river: “you cannot step into 
the same river twice” (Plato, 1997, Cratylus, 402a).   
The meaning of the concept ‘dialectics’ was transformed by Aristotle. For Aristotle dialectic wasn’t 
a form of being but rather a method of logical argumentation. Moreover, dialectic broke down its 
interconnection with dialogue and became mainly a method of building knowledge. In the Middle Ages 
dialectic was constructed as a method of argumentation on the basis of a set of logical rules (Nikulin, 
2010).  
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During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries an analytic method of knowledge production 
dominated in concrete sciences and a metaphysical mode of thinking in the field of philosophy (Pavlidis, 
2010). The metaphysical mode of thinking is based on the consideration of reality as a sum of separated, 
unconnected independent entities. A metaphysical outlook considers things as self-subsistent, isolated 
and abstracted from their context (Sayers, 1976). It denies fundamentally both the internal relatedness of 
all things and their development. 
The concept of ‘dialectic’ was reborn and acquired new meanings and connotations in the context 
of German classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and later in Marxism. Kant proposed “transcendental 
dialectic” as the logic of errors and illusions that arise when reason goes beyond its proper role in 
attempting to grasp the actual objects themselves (the thing-in-itself) (Williams, 2014). Kant demonstrated 
the structural necessity and inevitability of illusions. According to Kant, thinking confronts antinomies and 
falls into conflict with itself. Challenging Kant’s concept of dialectic as a logic of illusions, Hegel developed 
a “positive” dialectic based on the examination of a universal as a concrete unity of multiple 
determinations (Hegel, 2010). Dialectics was developed by Hegel as a method of thought that included 
the process of expounding contradictions and their resolution in the corpus of a rational understanding of 
an object (Ilyenkov, 1977). Materialistic dialectics developed by K. Marx as an attempt of the theoretical 
reconstruction of a concrete organic whole (the capitalist mode of production) through the creation of a 
system of interconnected concepts. 
The conscious (or systematic) dialectics stood against the metaphysical method of thinking. 
Dialectics and metaphysics constitute two different ways of thinking about thinking. In contrast to the 
metaphysical method based on one-dimensional, abstract analysis of an object and its elements as 
unchanging and immutable, dialectical thinking examines an object in the process of its change. The 
dialectical method focuses on the examination of things in their mutual connections, movement and 
development. Dialectics as a way of thinking grasps and represents the developmental process of a 
concrete object in its interconnections with other objects (Pavlidis, 2010). 
In the late 19th century and early 20th century the tendency of the rejection of dialectic and the 
acceptance of other trends such as Kantianism, philosophy of life and positivism became dominant in 
Western academy. The bulk of research for a long period in the Western academy was primarily 
associated with the assumptions of positivism and reductionism. In contrast to widespread reductionism 
in concrete disciplines which focuses on analysis of isolated elements of reality, the dialectic approach is 
oriented to grasp full complexity of interrelationships of reality and the contradictions that embody them 
(Bidell, 1988). The famous formula ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’ represents a very schematic and over 
simplistic description of the dialectical understanding of development. Such kind of caricatured 
representation of dialectics can give rise to the negative stance (or total rejection) of dialectical thinking. 
Laske (2009) argues that the dialectical mode of thinking “remains a closed book for the majority of adults 
in the Western world, while in Asian cultures nurtured by Buddhism it more easily assumes a common 
sense form” (Laske, 2009). Although the explanation of the negative stance toward a dialectical mode of 
thinking is out of scope of the present paper, I would like only to note that the increasing individualization, 
fragmentation and commercialization of social life in North America and Western Europe is not 
unconnected to a lack of understanding of dialectic at the level of everyday life.  
The multiple crises (economic, political, ecological and scientific) as a result of the increasing 
social contradictions and asymmetries in a rapidly changing world may provoke interest in dialectics as a 
way of the conceptualization of contradictions. However, dialectics is not a given system of postulates 
that can be immediately applied as an external guiding system for investigating problems. The application 






Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http://dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2018.189  |  Vol. 6 (2018) 
 
A7 
of dialectics to the concrete fields presupposes its essential development. The question of how to further 
develop dialectics in a rapidly changing world remains open for future investigation. 
Bakhtin's dialogism and dialectics 
Obviously, there are strong arguments for the incompatibility between dialectics and dialogism. It 
is possible to find several critical remarks on dialectics in Bakhtin's works: in his book “Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics” (PDP), and some writing included in the anthology “Speech Genres and Other Late 
Essays” (SG). Bakhtin's treatment of dialectics has fragmentary character and it did not include a 
systematic examination of the relationship between dialectics and dialogue.  
Bakhtin focused mainly on incompatibility between dialectics and dialogue. “Take a dialogue and 
remove the voices…remove the intonations…carve out the abstract concepts and judgments from living 
words and responses, cram everything into one abstract consciousness – and that’s how you get 
dialectics” (Bakhtin, 1986a, p. 147). Nevertheless, there is nothing more alien to dialectics than the idea 
of isolated, individual and abstract consciousness. Dialectics as a way of thinking emphasizes internal, 
essential connections between people rather than a separated individual, an abstract consciousness. 
Moreover, the concept ‘abstract’ has a different meaning in the dialectical theory of knowledge in 
relation to Bakhtin's quotation. Ilyenkov (1982b) brought into light the shortcoming of the view that the 
‘concrete’ is a product of sensuous experience and the ‘abstract’ is a result of rational thinking. Ilyenkov 
(1982b) demonstrated that the examination of the concrete as a synonym of an immediate sensual 
image, and the abstract, as a synonym of the conceptual follows the empiricist tradition. The repudiation 
of dialectics as a form of abstract thinking is based on the assumptions of empiricism that remains a 
dominant “paradigm” in the Western academy.  
Hegel in his wonderful text “Who thinks abstractly” pointed out that in regarding all other people 
exclusively from a narrow pragmatic viewpoint, an undeveloped person thinks abstractly. He highlighted 
the essence of the abstract thinking: “This is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the murderer except the 
abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in him with this simple quality” 
(Hegel, 1808/1966). Taking only one quality of a person and ignoring all of his (her) other qualities, not 
interested in the history of his (her) life is the essence of abstract thinking. In contrast to abstract thinking, 
Hegelian dialectics attempts to look at an object as a concrete unity of multiple and interconnected 
determinations.  
Bahktin's critical remarks on dialectics do not prove a replete incompatibility between dialectics 
and dialogue. Firstly, it is important to take into account the polemical context in which Bakhtin criticized 
the dominant, dogmatic version of dialectical materialism ("Diamat") in the USSR. Bakhtin's critique of 
Hegelian dialectic served as a form of disguised criticism of the official ideology in the form of "Diamat". 
Additionally, going beyond explicit criticism of Hegel's dialectic, it is possible to demonstrate that Bakhtin 
was implicitly involved in dialogue with it. Hegelian philosophy could not leave Bakhtin indifferent. Hegel’s 
philosophy was developed in dialogue with the main philosophical theories of his time as well as the 
previews stages in the history of philosophy. “... it is difficult to see how Hegel’s philosophy could not be 
considered part of a dialogue taking place with other philosophies of his time (and a dialogue in the 
history of philosophy as well). It would be just as difficult to consider his ‘monologue’ to be unanswered or 
‘unresponded’. It would be unfair, though, to reproach Bakhtin for a failure to understand Hegel’s voice, 
and to refuse to enter into a dialogue with it. Rather, we can assume that beyond the superficial direct 
critique of Hegel, Bakhtin in fact responded actively and more often implicitly to Hegelian philosophy in his 
own works...” (Côté, 2000, p. 26).  
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Several Bakhtin's followers argue that dialectics is a synonym of the Cartesian solitary 
consciousness or monological view of the world. “Dialectics is a product of the old monological, 
Newtonian view of the world” (Morson, & Emerson, 1990, p.57). However, dialectics had existed long 
before the appearance of the Newtonian view of the world in direct connection with dialogue.  
Hegel was far from accepting Cartesian “Cogito ergo sum” (“I think therefore I am”). From a 
Hegelian perspective, Man is not a solitary thinking being, a single individual. For Hegel, knowledge is a 
constituent moment of consciousness and self-consciousness, rather than an independent entity. Hegel's 
view that logical concepts cannot be derived from the individual mind provides a creative insight on the 
intersubjective nature of thinking. In contrast to the widespread reception of Hegelian philosophy in terms 
of Cartesian solitary consciousness and monologism, Luther (2009) offers evidence of Hegel's shift from 
Kantian-Cartesian “I” into “We”:  
“For Descartes and Kant, the individual subject is the source of knowledge; however, for Hegel, 
knowledge is a collective achievement. This represents a crucial shift from the first person singular to first 
person plural standpoint, and it has much in common with the paradigm shift from the philosophy of 
consciousness to the philosophy of intersubjectivity in the late twentieth century” (Luther, 2009, p. 4) 
At the same time, the Hegelian idea of absolute knowledge and Hegel's representation of his own 
philosophical system as the completion of self-development of thinking in human history is a monologic 
as well as an anti-dialectical idea. It is possible to reveal a contradiction between Hegel's dialectical 
thinking and his close, dogmatic system (as well as an internal contradiction in Hegel's understanding of 
dialectics).  
However, totally rejecting Hegelian dialectics means throwing out the baby with the bath water. 
The Hegelian analysis of master–slave relations1 in “Phenomenology of Spirit” is especially important for 
understanding the interconnection between dialectics and dialogue. The dialogical concept of mutual 
recognition became an integral part of the dialectical process of the historical development of 
consciousness and self-consciousness. In other words, Hegel incorporated the concept of dialogue in his 
dialectical Odyssey of consciousness and self-consciousness toward knowledge. The Hegelian analysis 
of master–slave relations provides a dialectical understanding of dialogue and the difficulties of promoting 
it in human history.  
Hegel attempted to describe the relations between self and other in a world in which there is no 
pre-established harmony between different participants, but a struggle for recognition between them 
takes place. Consciousness does not live in a self-sufficient isolation, but in a mutual relation with other 
consciousnesses. “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for 
another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (Hegel, 2004, p.111). For Hegel, developing an 
independent self-consciousness goes through mutual recognition.  
Hudson (2010) argues that despite their differences, it is possible to find some links between the 
Hegelian concept of mutual recognition and Buber's “I-Thou” philosophy of dialogue. Moreover, the 
Hegelian idea of an incomplete form of recognition between Master and Slave as a result of the 
perception of Slave as object bears striking similarities to Buber's formulation of the I-It relation. The 
treatment of asymmetrical relations between Master and Slave is one the most important contributions of 
the Hegelian investigation of the historical development of consciousness.  
                                                       
1 The German expression “Herrschaft und Knechtschaft” has been translated as “Master and Slave” (Or “Lordship and Bondage”) 
(Hegel, 2004).  
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Unlike Kant, Hegel didn't examine the relationships between consciousnesses in terms of an 
idealized deontological norm, but as they are shaped in hard contradictory historical reality. Hegel 
demonstrated that in human history the recognition between different consciousnesses is not mutual and 
reciprocal. Human history is not a linear progression but a contradictory, dramatic process. The inequality 
between Lordship and Bondage has been expressed in the fact that one consciousness recognizes other 
without being recognized. One consciousness has been recognized as an ‘autonomous’ existence and 
another as a ‘dependent’ existence. Hegel's analysis of dialectic of the dominance and servitude 
demonstrates in which way the hierarchical power relations reproduce distorted forms of consciousness. 
Moreover, Hegel brought to light the struggle for recognition as a crucial moment in the history of 
consciousness and self-consciousness.   
Marx's account of alienation and commodity fetishism offers a deep understanding of the 
distortion (degradation) of human relationships in the capitalist society. The relations between people 
appear to be relations between ‘things’ (commodities). From this perspective, it is hard to develop dialogic 
spaces without taking into account challenges of the commodification of human relationships and 
asymmetrical power relationships. The commodification of human relationships reproduces a monological 
way of thinking, because other subjects have been reduced to the status of material objects. It is 
interesting to note that Bakhtin linked monologism with “...absorbing other consciousnesses as objects 
into itself” (Bakhtin, 1984, 18).  
Obviously, it would be simplistic to equate the dialogic idea of multiple perspectives and voices 
with Marxian materialistic dialectics. Bakhtin's theory of dialogism has developed under the influence of 
fundamental ideas from neo-Kantianism, philosophy of life, and phenomenology. Especially important for 
the development of Bakhtin's theory of dialogism was Dilthey's understanding of human sciences as 
grounded in ‘lived experience’ (Erleben), ‘expression’ (Ausdruck), and ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) 
(Brandist, 2002, p.18). However, Marxism was also one of the strong voices in Bakhtin Circle. The impact 
of Marxism is felt in Voloshinov's (1973, 1976) books “Marxism and the Philosophy of Language” and 
“Freudianism: A Marxist critique”.  
Bulavka and Buzgalin (2004) consider dialectics as the basis of Bakhtin's dialogical world. From 
their perspective, the subject-subject relationship of dialogue as a relationship of qualitatively different 
integral beings represents a dialectical process of breakdown of the world of alienation, in which people 
relate to one another primarily as objects (commodity and money fetishism, the fetishization of 
bureaucratic hierarchy). Dialogue is presented as a window into a world of collaborative creativity, a joint 
creation of the participants themselves.  
Bulavka and Buzgalin (2004) distinguish two types of dialectics: the ‘old’ dialectical logic is 
oriented primarily toward the representation of objective processes, which do not depend on the will and 
activity of the subject. The ‘new’ dialectic is oriented to reflecting the subject-subject relationship, 
polyphony and collaborative creativity of the ‘realm of freedom’. The transition from the ‘old’ to new 
dialectics is examined through the prism of the shift from the ‘realm of necessity’ to the ‘realm of freedom’. 
A possible objection to this original interpretation of dialectics might be that the confrontation between the 
representation of objective processes and the reflection on subject-subject relationships reproduces an 
antidialectical subject-object dualism. The issue of the conceptualization of subject-subject and subject-
object relationships from a dialectical perspective remains at stake and provoke tensions. However, there 
is no doubt that resisting against the objectivation of human being, the adherents of the dialogical 
approach are focused mainly on understanding of subject-subject relationships. 
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Interconnection between consciousness and knowledge 
Dialectics and dialogue constitute two distinct traditions and each of them has its own logic of 
development in the history of human thought. Nevertheless, there was not an absolute gap between 
these traditions and it is possible to find complex relationships between them.  
Traditionally, dialectics has been conceived as a mode of thinking connected with a concrete form 
of knowledge production. “...modern dialectic still tends to become the organon of thinking...” (Nikulin, 
2010, p.71). Dialogue, on the other hand, has been traditionally conceptualized as a particular type of 
communication that creates shared meanings between different subjects. The concept of dialogue is 
more connected with the communication between consciousnesses rather than with knowledge 
production. However, there is not a gap between consciousness and knowledge. Dialectic connections 
develop in the interspace between consciousness and knowledge. On one side, consciousness includes 
knowledge as one of its moments. On the other side, reflective thinking has been involved in the dialogic 
communication between different subjects. Thus, thinking is not a solitary activity of a purely autonomous 
subject but a dialogical act, unfolding between different subjects. The knowledge representation of an 
object is socially mediated and the path to knowledge passes through relationships between subjects. 
Knowing with the other evidences the dialogical quality of consciousness (Shotter, 2006).  
The investigation of developing interrelations between thinking and speech was examined by 
Vygotsky (1987) as the key to understanding the nature of human consciousness. The analysis of the 
internal relations between thinking and speaking as sides of human consciousness constitutes one of the 
most important foundations for linking dialectics and dialogue. Vygotsky (1987) addressed this crucial 
issue from a psychological perspective, but it remains under-investigated. However, it is worth 
emphasizing that dialectical thinking is a specific type of thinking that develops at a concrete stage of the 
process of historical development of human consciousness. Dialectical thinking offers the opportunity to 
overcome widespread positivism and reductionism in science (Ilyenkov, 1982a, 1982b; Dafermos, 2014).  
In contrast to monologism, the dominant ‘paradigm’ in social and human sciences, Bakhtin 
revealed not only the dialogic nature of consciousness but also the perspective of conceptualization of 
thinking as a dialogue. “This mode of thinking makes available those sides of a human being, and above 
all the thinking human consciousness and the dialogic sphere of its existence, which are not subject to 
artistic assimilation from monologic positions” (Bakhtin, 1984, p.270). Dialogue was portrayed by Bakhtin 
as a unique meeting between several consciousnesses in a concrete moment of a historical and cultural 
chronotope.  
Bringing together dialectics and dialogue, Feuerbach pointed out that “The true dialectic is not a 
monologue of the solitary thinker with himself. It is a dialogue between “I” and “You” (Feuerbach, 1843). 
Criticizing Hegelian philosophy, Feuerbach demonstrated the shortcomings of a pure speculation, which a 
single thinker carries on by or with himself, and subsequently, he focused on dialogue between “I” and 
“You” as sensuous and concrete human beings. It is worth mentioning that Feuerbach's ideas on dialogue 
inspired Vygotsky to develop his theory of social education in the field of defectology: “Only social 
education can lead severely retarded children through the process of becoming human by eliminating the 
solitude of idiocy and severe retardation. L. Feuerbach’s wonderful phrase, might be taken as the motto 
to the study of development in abnormal children: ‘That which is impossible for one, is possible for two.’ 
Let us add: That which is impossible on the level of individual development becomes possible on the level 
of social development” (Vygotsky, 1993, pp. 218-219). 
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For Vygotsky, dialogue and collaboration between people becomes the basis of their social 
development. However, the question as to whether dialogue and development are compatible raises 
objections. 
Dialogue and development 
The issue of development provokes tensions between dialogic and dialectic approaches. 
Dialectics historically emerged as a way of the conceptualization of change and development. From a 
dialectical perspective, development has been conceptualized as a process that occurs due to internal 
contradictions within an object. Adherents of the dialogical approach tend to view the concept of 
development with an ambivalent attitude.  
Roth (2013) notes that scholars who follow Bakhtin's tradition often focus mainly on language use 
but not on the existence of different levels and forms of development (ontogenetic and phylogenetic). 
Moreover, Hegel's dialectical concept of development has been criticized by dialogical scholars for its 
monologism, determinism, and teleology (Holquist, 2002). “Hegel is often associated with a kind of 
postmodernist caricature of an abstract, hierarchical, decontextualised reason, but this is far from the 
truth” (Derry, 2013, p.110-111). Both Piaget's and Vygotsky's theories of development have been 
accused of universalism, decontextualization, ethnocentrism, and adultcentrism (Matusov, & Hayes, 
2000).  
Frequently, the critique of the dialectical concept of development has been implemented from the 
perspective of postmodernism that became a fashion trend in North Atlantic academic communities. 
“Postmodernity is a style of thought which is suspicious of classical notions of truth, reason, identity and 
objectivity of the idea of universal progress or emancipation, of single frameworks, grand narratives or 
ultimate grounds of explanation. Against these Enlightenment norms, it sees the world as contingent, 
ungrounded, diverse, unstable, indeterminate, a set of disunified cultures or interpretations which breed a 
degree of scepticism about the objectivity of truth, history and norms, the giveness of natures and the 
coherence of identities” (Eangleton, 2003, vii). Eagleton argues that postmodernism has as a material 
condition a shift to a new form of capitalism - “to the ephemeral, decentralized world of technology, 
consumerism and the culture industry, in which the service, finance and information industries triumph 
over traditional manufacture, and classical class politics yield ground to a diffuse range of ‘identity 
politics’” (Eagleton, 2003, vii).  
However, in its attacks against ‘grand narratives of modernity’ postmodernism presupposes 
precisely these principles that it simultaneously rejects. “The Hegelian reply to postmodern discourse 
theory is as powerful as it is simple. Postmodern discourse theory presupposes exactly what it omits: the 
totality of an intersubjective rationality expressed in the medium of a shared language” (Boucher, 2000). 
Moreover, rejecting universalistic claims of developmentalism, cultural relativism leads to legitimation of 
the universalistic claims of diverse cultural communities and hierarchical relations of power within them. 
“The increasing globalization and homogenization of culture and its fragmentation and localization are in 
fact closely related. Global universalism and postmodern particularism are actually two sides of the same 
coin” (Dafermos, 2013b, p.8).  
Cultural differences and local contexts tend to become new absolutes: “...if something is 
contextual, it cannot be universal’. Interestingly enough, relativism seems to be based on such absolutes” 
(Bang, 2008, p.51). In contrast to traditional developmental absolutism, a post-modernistic anti-
development absolutism emerged with “its total acceptance of the ephemerality, fragmentation, 
discontinuity, and the chaotic.... ” (Harvey, 1989, p.44). Anti-development absolutism is based on the 






Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal | http://dpj.pitt.edu 
DOI: 10.5195/dpj.2018.189  |  Vol. 6 (2018) 
 
A12 
postmodern celebration of cultural differences, heterogeneity and plurality. Promoting a post-modern 
celebration of particularity tends to turn into a fashionable monologue about difference based on the 
reception and assimilation of ‘otherness’ in terms of cultural difference. Post-modern monologism of 
difference is connected with the strong tendencies toward fragmentation of social life that characterizes 
new form of capitalism.  
The idea of the existence of irreconcilable differences between participants of a dialogue is based 
on the dominance of alienation. Both the idea of the existence of irreconcilable differences between the 
participants of a dialogue and the legalistic concept of ‘consensus’ between them constitute two sides of 
the same coin of a society based on alienation, isolation and fragmentation. The concept of ‘consensus’ 
points to an external type of agreement between alienated people in the context of a legalistic approach 
to human relations. The post-modern celebration of irreconcilable differences between the participants of 
dialogue might give rise to the legalization of the fragmentation of social space as well as the alienation 
between people.   
Contrary to the view about an absolute gap between a dialogical approach and a dialectical 
concept of development, it is possible to find in Bakhtin's writings some ideas that seem unpredictably 
closer to dialectical understanding than to postmodernist celebration of the fragmentation of culture. “The 
study of culture (or some area of it) at the level of system and at the higher level of organic unity: open, 
becoming, unresolved and unpredetermined, capable of death and renewal, transcending itself, that is, 
exceeding its own boundaries” (Bakhtin, 1986a, p.135). Bakhtin's idea of an open, developing organic 
unity is a truly dialectical insight in the theorizing of human sciences. The contradictory coexistence of 
‘death’ and ‘rebirth’ constitutes a moment of a dialectical understanding of culture. I don't claim that 
Bakhtin was a dialectical theorist, but only that it is possible to find influences of dialectics in his writings. 
In other words, there is no absolute gap or a rupture between dialogic and dialectic traditions but 
paradoxically, a dramatic relation between them might be detected.  
From a developmental perspective, dialogue cannot be reduced to a simple communicative 
interaction or a conversation. Not every communicative interaction or conversation promotes human 
development. Dialogue is such a conversation that does promote human development. Dramatic tensions 
and collisions in a dialogue might become a source of personal growth for their participants. In other 
words, dialogue opens up the perspective of personal growth for subjects engaged in it (Apatow, 1998). 
“...the discursive dynamics has as its central question the ways to critically negotiate/collaborate 
meanings, highlighting the contradiction as a driving force for the development between participants with 
different social, historical, cultural and political constitutions” (Magalhães, Ninin, & Lessa, 2014, p.142).  
Explaining the deep meaning of the general genetic law of cultural development as it was 
formulated by Vygotsky, Veresov notes: “Dramatic character development, development through 
contradictory events (acts of development), category (dramatic collision) — this was Vygotsky's 
formulation and emphasis” (Veresov, 2010, p.88). The dramatic collision, conflicts and contradictory 
relations that emerge in a dialogue as they are experienced by its participants may promote their self 
reflection and personal growth.  
The dialectic of change constitutes an essential dimension of a dialogue. “...neither a first nor a 
last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends into the boundless past and the 
boundless future). Even past meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be 
stable (finalized, ended once and for all) – they will always change (be renewed) in the process of 
subsequent development of the dialogue” (Bakhtin, 1986a, p.170). 
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Both dialogue and dialectics can be examined in terms of a drama that includes tensions, 
conflicts between opposing forces, contradictions and crises. Bakhtin wrote about Dostoevsky who was 
able to offer “a living reflection of the contradictions of contemporary society in the cross-section of a 
single day...Where others saw a single thought, he was able to find and feel out two thoughts, a 
bifurcation; where others saw a single quality, he discovered in it the presence of a second and 
contradictory quality” (Bakhtin, 1984, p.30). From this perspective, a dialectical understanding of the 
internal contradictions of society as they are expressed in everyday life means the dramatic relationships 
between people are an essential moment of a dialogue. Dialogue without considering such kind of 
dramatic tensions and contradictions as they have been experienced by subjects involved in this process 
may be turned into an external lifeless form. Οn the contrary, as I already mentioned, dramatic tensions 
and contradictions in the dialogical spaces may become a source of development for their participants. 
If dialogue wants to consider larger social dynamics, it has to talk to the 
dialectic tradition 
I will conclude by saying that the relationships between dialectics and dialogue are more complex 
and paradoxical than they are usually presented. The ‘horror of dialectics’ (Gardiner, 2000) in the field of 
Bakhtin studies constitutes an obstacle for developing a dialogue between these distinct but interrelated 
traditions in human sciences.  
Although both dialogue and dialectic share a common origin in ancient Greek philosophy, they 
historically developed as independent theoretical traditions with their own conceptual apparatus. The 
dialogic tradition is associated with the concepts of ‘voices,’ ‘utterance,’ speech genres, ‘polyphony’. The 
dialectic tradition is based on the concepts of ‘contradiction,’ ‘development,’ the distinction between 
‘understanding’ and ‘reason’.  
In contrast to the dominance of positivism in the North Atlantic Academy, both dialectics and 
dialogism have been developed as attractive alternatives. However, while dialogism and dialectics as 
theoretical frameworks have essential differences, there is a common space between them and “they also 
mutually enrich each other” (Sullivan, 2010, p.362).  
Dialectics might offer in dialogical research a creative perspective for re-opening history (included 
the history of thought) as a contradictory process. For example, the lack of dialectical thinking constitutes 
an obstacle in the study of the historical development of Bakhtin's works. Many Bakhtian scholars 
encounter difficulties in understanding “inconsistent positions”, “shifts in terminology” in writings of the 
founder of theory of dialogism, “...contradictory evidence regarding the authorship of the so-called 
disputed texts...”, “quite contradictory account of his life” (Brandist, & Shepherd, 1998, p.9,10). As a result 
of the dominance of a presentist and teleological mode of thinking and the absence of a dialectical 
understanding of the development of Bakhtin works, many Bakhtian scholars tend to “read the early texts 
through those of the central or later period, which were published first, and thus to read early concepts in 
terms of later ones” (Brandist, & Shepherd, 1998, p.10). A dialectical approach with its focus on 
contradictions, change, totality, development may offer insights on Bakhtin’s creative laboratory and 
reveal its complexity. 
Dialectical thinking can also contribute to an understanding of the difficulties in developing 
dialogue in hard reality of the overarching power relations (presented by Hegel as ‘master–slave 
relations’), growing social inequalities and increasing commoditization of all aspects of human life and 
experience. Οtherwise, dialogue may be turned into a noble and idealized deontological principle but 
unable to meet the challenges of hard historical reality.  
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Dialogue offers a creative insight into going beyond truth as ‘istina’ (as a pure cognitive endeavor) 
toward truth as ‘pravda’ (as embodied and lived) (Bakhtin, 1993; Sullivan, 2010). “As we develop our 
consciousness through participation in social life, it is the potential of the other’s response and its 
affective impact upon our sense of what we are doing that makes consciousness more indeterminate and 
more experiential than the truth of the dialectic allows” (Sullivan, 2010, p. 375). Focusing on 
intersubjective and ethical dimensions of knowing, a dialogical approach allows intellectualism to be 
avoided and challenges of communication to be faced between unique personalities in complex and 
uncertain situations.  
Dialectical thinking is ongoing and unfinalizable as is dialogue. Both dialogue and dialectics 
historically change. Opening up new spaces for sharing and mutual enrichment between dialogue and 
dialectics may give rise to their unpredictable transformations. Perhaps, the initial starting point of the 
internal connection between ‘dialogue’ and ‘dialectic’ in Ancient Greece will be reborn in a new, 
unpredictable form in the future. “Nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will celebrate its rebirth” 
(Bakhtin, 1986b, p. 393). Despite his serious objections, noted above, Bakhtin acknowledged that 
dialectics can give rise “a higher level dialogue” (Matusov, 2009, p.385). Bakhtin found a perspective of 
bridging dialectics and dialogue on the basis of a Hegelian argument: “Dialectics was born of dialogue so 
as to return again to dialogue on a higher level (a dialogue of personalities)” (Bakhtin, 1986a, 166). 
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